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SEAN M. DUNPHY· 

JOHN H. CROSS·· 

INTRODUCTION 
In his book, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, I Professor 
Jay Katz describes the apparently ingrained belief of physicians that 
patients are unequal partners in the medical decisionmaking process. 
Professor Katz contends that this insistence on authority has stifled 
any serious exploration of whether doctors and patients can interact 
with one another on the basis of greater equality. "Thus the idea of 
informed consent-of mutual decisionmaking-remains severely com­
promised" (p. 87). 
A related context is that of medical decisionmaking for incompe­
tent persons. In the next few pages, the authors will explore this area 
in terms of Massachusetts law, focusing particularly on extraordinary 
treatment situations. We believe that physicians' insistence on author­
ity creates additional and unnecessary obstacles to meeting the legiti­
mate treatment needs of incompetent patients. This traditional 
attitude on the part of the medical community, coupled with the con­
tinuing confusion on the part of both doctors and lawyers regarding 
the substituted judgment doctrine, poses the risk of seriously compro­
mising the civil rights of incompetent persons. 
Judges, in making substituted judgments for incompetent per­
sons, are in an analogous position to that of competent patients in 
relation to their physicians. The judge's duty is to discover and imple­
ment the incompetent person's own values and preferences and not to 
• Presiding Justice of the Hampshire Division of the Probate and Family Court 
Department; B.B.S., Fairfield University, 1962; J.D., Boston University School of Law, 
1965. 
•• First Assistant Register of the Hampshire Division of the Probate and Family 
Court Department; Member of the Massachusetts Mental Health Legal Advisors' Com­
mittee; A.B., Cornell University, 1971; J.D., Boston University School of Law, 1974. 
I. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (\984). 
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defer to physician authority as a conditioned response. Judges, like 
patients, can benefit from Professor Katz's model of effective, respect­
ful conversation, albeit within the confines of a formal judicial 
proceeding. 
I. THE SAIKEWICZ DECISION 
A. Significance of the Decision 
In 1977, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued its 
landmark decision regarding potentially life-prolonging medical treat­
ment for an incompetent person~uperintendent ofBelchertown State 
School v. Saikewicz. 2 Factually, the case involved the question of 
whether chemotherapy should be administered to a mentally retarded 
person who suffered from leukemia and who was incapable, due to his 
profound mental retardation, of making a medical treatment decision. 
The Saikewicz opinion rejected the idea that such decisionmaking 
responsibility should be delegated either to doctors or family members 
or guardians.3 Instead, the supreme judicial court held that the trial 
court should make a so-called "substituted judgment" determination 
by substituting itself for the ward and attempting to ascertain his ac­
tual interests and preferences.4 In essence, the supreme judicial court 
fashioned a judicial decisionmaking model to be applied in cases in­
volving the question of whether life-prolonging treatment should be 
administered to incompetent persons. 
The reaction of the medical community to Saikewicz was ex­
tremely negative. As one physician wrote, "[t]his astonishing opinion 
can only be viewed as a resounding vote of 'no confidence' in the abil­
ity of physicians and families to act in the best interests of the incapa­
ble patient suffering from a terminal illness."5 
The supreme judicial court, however, did not view its decision as 
a "gratuitous encroachment on the domain ofphysicians."6 From the 
authors' perspective, too much of the discussion of this judicial deci­
sionmaking model has been couched' in terms of lawyers or judges 
usurping the traditional role of physicians. Such narrow perspective 
misses the important considerations which underlie the Saikewicz 
opinion and the decisions following Saikewicz which have extended 
2. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). 
3. Id. at 758, 370 N.E.2d at 434. 
4. Id. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 431. 
5. ReIman, The Saikewicz Decision: Judges as Physicians, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
508, 509 (1978). 
6. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435. 
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the substituted judgment doctrine to other areas of medical care and 
treatment. A review of the basic tenets of these decisions underscores 
the important but different roles of the court, the medical community, 
and other players in extraordinary medical treatment cases. 
B. Judicial Analysis and Reasoning 
According to Saikewicz, one of the underlying principles of the 
substituted judgment doctrine is the constitutional right of an individ­
ual to privacy, a guaranty which encompasses the choice to accept or 
to refuse medical treatment. 7 This fundamental right extends "not 
only to competent patients but also to incompetent persons because 
the value of human dignity extends to both."8 
It is important to note that a substituted judgment determination 
cannot be made until there is a judicial determination of incompetency 
by reason of an individual's minority,9 mental illness,1O or mental re­
tardation. II A person is presumed to be capable of handling his or her 
affairs unless shown by the evidence presented to be incompetent. 12 
The law protects an individual's right to accept or reject medical treat­
ment, whether that decision is wise or unwise. 13 As set forth in the 
Saikewicz decision, once a determination of incompetency has been 
made, the role of the court is to substitute itself as nearly as possible 
for the incompetent person and to act on the same motives and consid­
erations as would move the incompetent person. The court's role as 
substitute decisionmaker is subjective in nature-that is, the goal is to 
determine with as much accuracy as possible the wants and needs of 
the individual involved. This mayor may not conform to what is 
thought wise or prudent by most people. The problems of arriving at 
an accurate substituted judgment in matters of life and death vary 
greatly in degree, if not in kind, in different circumstances. 14 
The Saikewicz court, in essence, forced conversation between the 
physician and the trial court about the incompetent's medical and 
nonmedical wants and needs. In doing so, the court established a for­
malized variant of Professor Katz's goal of self-reflective conversation 
7. Id. at 738-39, 744-45, 370 N.E.2d at 424, 427. 
8. Id. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 427. 
9. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 2 (West Supp. 1986). 
10. Id. at § 6. 
11. Id. at § 6A. 
12. Id. at §§ 6 & 6A. 
13. Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978). 
14. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz. 373 Mass. 728, 750-51, 
370 N.E.2d 417, 430 (1977). 
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between doctor and patient. Both models are designed to eradicate a 
silent relationship between doctor and patient. Professor Katz pro­
poses a decisionmaking process in which the parties concentrate on 
conscious and unconscious values affecting their positions on treat­
ment, with hope leading both to recognize previously unspoken bases 
for the final decision (pp. iii-4, 150-55). Professor Katz's model ad­
dresses a silent world in which one party dominates and refuses to 
communicate to the other; the Saikewicz court addresses a silent world 
in which the parties cannot communicate with each other because of 
one's disability. 
The supreme judicial court has established a process which seeks 
information similar to that Professor Katz wished to realize in his own 
model: the trial court and the doctor attempt to discover how the 
incompetent person would view the treatment options, with the court 
deciding which facts are important and using them to make a final 
decision. The Saikewicz court also demonstrated the same respect as 
Katz does for the sanctity of the patient's final decision, whether or 
not the decision seems reasonable to doctors or other similarly situated 
patients. As Professor Katz stated, "Although [respecting patients' 
ultimate decisions] may mean bowing at times to 'foolish' choices, 
they must be honored to protect the process of thinking about 
choices..." (p. 154). Katz and the Saikewicz court seem to agree 
that preserving a patient's right to self-determination begins with pro­
tection of the method through which the patient's wishes and needs 
are best expressed, regardless of the outcome. 
Respect for the outcome in substituted judgment determinations, 
however, is not absolute until the final participant-the state--deter­
mines that the incompetent person's interests do not conflict with its 
own interests in the decision. The court must balance the individual's 
interests against potentially countervailing state interests, which have 
been defined as "(1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the 
interests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) 
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession."15 In 
Saikewicz, the supreme judicial court found no state interest or combi­
nation of interests sufficient to override the patient's decision, as deter­
mined by the trial court, to decline life-prolonging treatment. 16 
c. 	 Cases Following Saikewicz 
At this juncture, it is appropriate to underscore two related com­
15. 	 Id. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425. 
16. Id. at 744·45, 370 N.E.2d at 427. 
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ments made by the supreme judicial court in cases following 
Saikewicz. First, a substituted judgment decision is distinct from a 
decision by doctors as to what is medically in the "best interests" of 
the patient.J7 Secondly, medical advice and opinion are to be used for 
the same purposes and to the same extent that the incompetent indi­
vidual would, if he or she were competent. IS These comments and the 
Saikewicz decision clarify the respective roles of the trial judge and the 
treating physician. The judge is to probe the individual's values and 
preferences, while the physician is to present and explain treatment 
options. As Professor Katz commented, 
no single right decision exists for how the life of health and illness 
should be lived. Medical advances have led to a proliferation of 
treatment options and a better understanding of their benefits and 
risks. Alleviation of suffering can be accomplished in a variety of 
ways and alternative choices must be explained. Physicians alone 
cannot decide which treatment is best. The patient must be con­
sulted (p. 102). 
In cases of extraordinary medical treatment for incompetent persons, 
the court, in effect, stands in the place of the patient for the purpose of 
considering medical advice and opinion. Beyond this, the court must 
balance the patient's individual interests against potentially counter­
vailing state interests. 
From the authors' point of view, the role of the physician is 
neither diminished nor reduced in this process-unless one perceives 
such role as including ultimate decisionmaking responsibility for in­
competent persons. In the case of Rogers v. Commissioner of Depart­
ment of Mental Health,19 the psychiatric profession argued that if a 
substituted judgment is to be required before there can be forcible ad­
ministration of antipsychotic medication to involuntarily confined, in­
competent patients, the decision as to substituted judgment should be 
made by a physician and not a judge. The supreme judicial court re­
jected this procedure, the so-called medical model, citing, among other 
things, the likelihood of conflicting interests on the part of physicians. 
Doctors, according to the opinion, are not only attempting to treat 
psychiatric patients but also to maintain institutional order. Thus, 
"the temptation to engage in blanket prescription of such drugs to 
maintain order and compensate for personnel shortages may be irresis­
17. In re Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 435, 421 N.E.2d 40,52 (1981). 
18. Id. at 435, 421 N.E.2d at 52; Rogers v. Comm'r of Dept. of Mental Health, 390 
Mass. 489, 500, 458 N.E.2d 308, 317 (1983). 
19. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 502, 458 N.E.2d at 317. 
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tible. "20 As Professor Katz comments, "The idea that doctors know 
what is in their patients' interest and therefore can act on their behalf 
without inquiry is so patently untrue that one can only marvel at the 
fervor with which the notion has been defended (p. 98). The supreme 
judicial court has repeatedly rejected any delegation of decisionmaking 
responsibility away from the court in extraordinary treatment 
situations.21 
In the aftermath of Saikewicz, there have been a number of cases 
involving life-prolonging treatment issues. The supreme judicial court 
and appeals court consistently have applied the substituted judgment 
doctrine on behalf of mentally incompetent persons or minor chil­
dren.22 The supreme judicial court and appeals court have also ex­
tended the substituted judgment doctrine and judicial decisionmaking 
responsibility to other areas of extraordinary medical care and treat­
ment, including sterilization,23 antipsychotic medication,24 and artifi­
cial maintenance of nutrition and hydration.25 In dicta, 
Massachusetts courts have also included electroconvulsive therapy 
and psychosurgery. 26 
Thus far, courts have defined extraordinary medical treatment on 
a case-by-case basis. In In re Spring, the supreme judicial court sug­
gested a number of factors to be considered in determining whether a 
prior court order is needed with respect to medical treatment for in­
competent patients.27 
20. Id. at 504 n.19, 458 N.E.2d at 318 n.19. 
21. See infra notes 22-25. 
22. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978) (order continuing 
chemotherapy for minor child over parental objection); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 
N.E.2d 115 (1980) (order withholding hemodialysis from incompetent person); Custody of 
a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982) (approval of "no-code" order for minor 
child with serious cardiac problems); In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959 
(1984) (order withholding surgical procedure necessary to provide ward with adequate nu­
trition support). 
In Comm'r of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979), the court 
ordered hemodialysis for a competent individual who was refusing treatment. The critical 
factor in this case was the patient's status as a prison inmate and the state's overriding 
interest in upholding orderly prison administration. 
23. In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982). 
24. Rogers v. Comm'r of Dept. of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 
(1983); In re Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981). 
25. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 
(1986). 
26. Roe, 383 Mass. at 437, 421 N.E.2d at 53. 

27. These factors include the following: 

the extent of impairment of the patient's mental faculties; whether the patient is 

in the custody of a State institution; the prognosis without the proposed treat­

ment; the prognosis with the proposed treatment; the complexity, risk, and nov­
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II. THE JUDGE'S ROLE 

In The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient, Professor Katz com­
mented on the tendency of patients to defer to doctors with "unques­
tioning compliance, unilateral trust, and verbal silence" (p. 100). 
There is a similar tendency on the part of trial judges, when con­
fronted with a substituted judgment determination, to question their 
roles in making such a decision. A not infrequent comment on the part 
of judges is, "I'm not a doctor. I have no business making a medical 
decision." This perspective misses the critical point that. the trial 
judge's role is to stand in place of the ward and attempt to ascertain 
the incompetent person's actual values and preferences. The condi­
tioned response of deferring to the authority of physicians is perhaps 
best illustrated by the following dialogue excerpted from the trial tran­
script in Saikewicz. Admittedly, the trial court judge was presiding 
over what was at that time a . novel and rather extraordinary 
proceeding. 
THE COURT: There is evidence that chemotherapy treatment is 
apparently the only treatment, but by giving it to him he may have 
some discomfiture at the time of the treatment that may prolong his 
life. 
DR. DAVIS: That is one thing and if they don't give it to him at 
all, then he may die in a matter of days or weeks. 
THE COURT: That is the choice I have to make. 
DR. DAVIS: That is it. I don't know. I don't have that deep 
knowledge. 
THE COURT: I am inclined to give treatment. 
DR. JONES: One thing that concerns me is the question about his 
ability to cooperate. I think it's been made clear that he doesn't 
have the capability to understand the treatment and he mayor may 
not be cooperative, therefore greatly complicating the treatment 
process.... That has to be weighed, whether [the treatment] could 
be administered. 
THE COURT: Dr. Davis, do you agree? 
DR. DAVIS: I think it's going to be virtually impossible to carry 
out the treatment in the proper way without having problems. You 
have to see him. When you approach him in the hospital, he flails 
elty of the proposed treatment; its possible side effects; the patient's level of 
understanding and probable reaction; the urgency of decision; the consent of the 
patient, spouse, or guardian; the good faith of those who participate in the deci­
sion; the clarity of professional opinion as to what is good medical practice; the 
interests of third persons; and the administrative requirements of any institution 
involved. 
In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 636-37, 405 N.E.2d lIS, 121 (1980). 
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at you and there is no way of communicating with him and he is 
quite strong; so he will have to be restrained and that increases the 
chances of pneumonia, to restrain him if he can't be up and around. 
MR. MELNICK [Court-appointed guardian for Saikewicz, who 
concurred in the physicians' determination to withhold treatment]: 
With no treatment he may live longer; with treatment, the treat­
ment itself may terminate his life sooner. There is some risk be­
cause of the toxic nature of the treatment, so in effect, by ordering 
the treatment there is a possibility that you may shorten his life and 
there is a chance that you may be prolonging it. 
THE COURT: Maybe I should change my judgment. 
DR. DAVIS: One other factor. Though we will get a remission, we 
are not through at that point. He'd have to be under medical care 
weekly and continue treatment and he may be in the hospital for 
four to five weeks initially and will have to be coming back on a 
regular basis. That enters the picture. 
* * * * 
THE COURT: Do I have to form a written judgment? 
MR. ROGERS: Yes, I will draft it. 
THE COURT: After a full hearing with medical specialists and 
doctors being present and their testimony being taken, the Court 
determines and adjudges that chemotherapy treatment should not 
be given at this time.28 
The Saikewicz line of decisions now provides both guidance and 
instruction for the trial court judge. For example, in the Roe opinion, 
the supreme judicial court identified six factors to be considered by the 
judge in making a substituted judgment determination. These include: 
"(1) the ward's expressed preferences regarding treatment; (2) his reli­
gious beliefs; (3) the impact upon the ward's family; (4) the probability 
of adverse side effects; (5) the consequences if treatment is refused; and 
(6) the prognosis with treatment."29 This criteria is not exclusive, but 
rather provides a basic framework for the judge's inquiry. The Roe 
decision also states, "In this search, procedural intricacies and techni­
cal niceties must yield to the need to know the actual values and pref­
erences of the ward."30 
In the Moe decision, the supreme judicial court developed de­
tailed and specialized criteria for the trial court judge to apply in ster­
ilization cases. 3I The supreme judicial court stressed that the judge 
28. R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PA­
TIENT RELATIONS 155-57 (1979). 
29. Roe, 383 Mass. at 444, 421 N.E.2d at 57. 
30. Id. 
31. Moe, 385 Mass. at 567-70,432 N.E.2d at 721-22. 
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must exercise the utmost care in reviewing all of the evidence 
presented. "The judge must enter detailed written findings indicating 
those persuasive factors that determine the outcome. We are per­
suaded that a conscientious judge . . . will give serious and heedful 
attention to all stages of the proceeding."32 
In Saikewicz, the supreme judicial court indicated that the trial 
judge may, at any stage in the proceedings, "avail himself or herself of 
the additional advice or knowledge of any person or group," including 
medical experts or medical ethics committees or panels.33 Although 
such information may be considered by the court whenever available 
and useful, the judge may not delegate to any individual or group the 
ultimate decisionmaking responsibility. According to the supreme ju­
dicial court, "such questions . . . seem to us to require the process of 
detached but passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal 
on which the judicial branch of government was created."34 
III. THE ApPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
AND/OR COUNSEL 
To assist further the trial judge, the supreme judicial court has 
indicated that a guardian ad litem should be appointed to represent 
the interests of the proposed ward.35 At a minimum, the guardian ad 
litem must ensure that all viewpoints and alternatives to the relief re­
quested are presented to the court. 36 In addition, there apparently has 
been some continuing confusion regarding the guardian ad litem role, 
specifically, whether the guardian ad litem is to conduct an independ­
ent investigation for the court or to act as counsel for the ward. Fol­
lowing the Rogers decision, the Probate and Family Court 
Department issued procedures which call for the appointment of 
counsel in all antipsychotic medication cases.37 The appointment of a 
guardian ad litem remains discretionary with the court. The proce­
dures clarify the respective roles of counsel and guardian ad litem, 
with counsel representing the proposed ward and acting as his or her 
32. Id. at 572, 432 N.E.2d at 724. 
33. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 757-58, 370 N.E.2d at 434. 
34. Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435. 
35. Id. at 757, 370 N.E.2d at 433. 
36. Id. 
37. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, PROBATE AND FAMILY COURT DEPARTMENT, 
OUTLINE OF PROCEDURES FOR CASES BROUGHT PURSUANT TO ROGERS v. COMM'R. OF 
MENTAL HEALTH (1984). The Office issued these procedures on May 10, 1984, and they 
are available at each Massachusetts Registry of Probate. 
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advocate, and the guardian ad litem serving as an independent investi­
gator for the court. 
IV. THE ADVERSARIAL NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The authors have received comments from both physicians and 
counsel for the Commonwealth to the effect that the appointment of 
counsel renders these proceedings unnecessarily adversarial. 38 From 
our perspective, however, effective assistance of counsel serves only to 
protect the important interests of the ward. At a minimum, counsel 
for the ward can ensure that the court has before it a complete picture 
of the case. For example, upon cross-examination of the treating phy­
sician, counsel can probe alternatives to the recommended treatment 
or pose questions regarding the patient's alleged incompetency. The 
use of independent medical experts can also prove invaluable in this 
regard.39 For the treating physician, the only discomfort may be some 
very direct questioning regarding his or her evaluation and recom­
mended treatment. The reality is that most physicians have very legit­
imate reasons for their treatment recommendations, and the 
substituted judgment doctrine does no more than require them to ar­
ticulate such reasons. This is the judicial version of "respectful con­
versation" with the physician. In addition, physicians are not the only 
witnesses in these proceedings. Family members may testify as to their 
involvement with the patient and their position regarding treatment. 
Frequently, the patient will take the witness stand and articulate his or 
her preference regarding recommended treatment. Additional wit­
nesses might include psychologists, social workers, or laypersons who 
have direct involvement with the patient. Although most of the ques­
tioning is conducted by respective counsel, the trial judge, as substitute 
decisionmaker, should not hesitate to question any or all of the wit­
nesses, particularly if there is a need for additional information regard­
ing the substituted judgment criteria or clarification or elaboration of 
previous testimony . 
. V. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS MODEL 
A further criticism of the Massachusetts substituted judgment 
38. The authors have handled over two hundred antipsychotic medication cases and 
numerous other cases involving a variety of extraordinary medical treatment issues. 
39. In Guardianship of a Mentally III Person with the Authority to Administer An­
tipsychotic Medication, No. 85-0018 Civ. (Mass. App. Ct. 1985), the Massachusetts Ap­
peals Court held that an indigent patient in a Rogers guardianship proceeding is entitled to 
the assistance of a medical expert at the Commonwealth's expense. 
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model, voiced by both doctors and lawyers, is that the requirement of 
prior judicial approval has created an extremely cumbersome pro­
cess.40 Admittedly, many medical decisions must be made on an ur­
gent or at least expedited basis. The supreme judicial court addressed 
this issue in several of its decisions following Saikewicz. 
To begin with, physicians may act in emergency situations. In 
Roe, the supreme judicial court accepted the diCtionary definition of 
emergency, i. e., "an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the 
resulting state that calls for immediate action."41 The supreme judi­
cial court, however, added an important qualification: 
We ... emphasize that in determining whether an emergency exists 
in terms of requiring 'immediate action,' the relevant time period to 
be examined begins when the claimed emergency arises, and ends 
when the individual who seeks to act in the emergency could, with 
reasonable diligence, obtain judicial review of his proposed actions. 
This time period will, of course, be brief. . . .42 
In Rogers, the supreme judicial court pointed to the Common­
wealth's statutory and regulatory scheme regarding the use of antip­
sychotiC medications as chemical restraints in emergency situations. 
The Rogers opinion also allowed forcible treatment with antipsychotic 
mediCation of incompetent persons to prevent the "immediate, sub­
stantial, and irreversible deterioration of a serious mental illness."43 
Reading Roe and Rogers together, it is our view that although 
physicians may act in emergencies, they are not relieved from proceed­
ing to court if extraordinary medical treatment is to be rendered on an 
ongoing basis. 
The supreme judicial court has stressed that expedited procedures 
exist on the trial court level to handle urgent medical cases.44 Massa­
chusetts General Law, chapter 201 and Rule 29B of the Probate 
Courts provide for the appointment of a temporary guardian by a pro­
bate judge.45 The Massachusetts trial court has also developed the 
Judicial Response System, which makes judges available after normal 
40. See, e.g., Curran, The Saikewicz Decision, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 499, 500 
(1978). 
41. In re Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 440, 421 N.E.2d 40, 54 (1981). 
42. Id. at 441, 421 N.E.2d at 55. 
43. Rogers v. Comm'r of Dept. of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 511, 458 N.E.2d 
308, 322 (1983). 
44. In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 642, 405 N.E.2d 115, 123 (1980). 
45. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201 (West Supp. 1986); Mass. P. Ct. R. § 29B 
(1987). 
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working hours and on weekends and holidays.46 Thus, judges are ac­
cessible around the clock to handle urgent medical matters. 
VI. JUDICIAL AND MEDICAL RESOURCES 
Following the Rogers decision, the Department of Mental Health 
estimated that several thousand cases would be filed seeking judicial 
authorization to administer antipsychotic medication to mentally ill 
and mentally retarded persons in the Department's care.47 A number 
of the divisions of the Probate and Family Court Department are now 
experiencing difficulty handling the sheer volume of cases. With the 
passage of recent legislation, the District Court Department has also 
begun to hear Rogers-type cases.48 In the authors' view, it is impera­
tive that the Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court, along 
with the Chief Justices of the District Court and Probate and Family 
Court Departments, allocate additional resources to those divisions of 
the trial court which presently are facing particularly heavy case loads. 
These resources should include, at a minimum, the assignment of ad­
ditional judges and support staff and the allocation of funds to provide 
monitoring of court-ordered treatment. The monitoring of treatment 
by guardians, if available, or by the court itself is an essential aspect of 
the Rogers decision.49 Consideration also should be given to schedul­
ing special sessions or appointing masters for the purposes of handling 
antipsychotic medication cases. In the absence of adequate judicial 
resources, it will be impossible to comply with the requirements of 
Rogers. 
Professor Katz mentioned the economic arguments raised by 
physicians, admitting that "greater fidelity to disclosure and consent 
will be costly both in physicians' time and patients' fees" (p. 201). In 
cases involving extraordinary medical care for incompetent patients, 
the resource commitment on the part of physicians is a very legitimate 
concern, particularly as the judicial hearings may require the appear­
ance and testimony of physicians. Some doctors, however, have opted 
to simply avoid the court process altogether. 50 There is reportedly 
widespread noncompliance with the Rogers decision on the part of 
46. Information regarding the Judicial Response System may be obtained from the 
respective Registries of Probate. 
47. R. Ames, Rogers-Implications for Administration of Antipsychotic Medication 
(Dec. 16, 1983) (Massachusetts Department of Mental Health memorandum). 
48. 1985 Mass. Acts 344. 
49. Rogers, 380 Mass. at 504 n.20, 458 N.E.2d at 318 n.20. 
50. Interview with Jeffrey MacKenzie, Esq., Massachusetts Department of Mental 
Health Legal Office, in Northampton, Massachusetts (January 21, 1986). 
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physicians in both the community and institutional settings. 51 Thus, 
many incompetent mentally ill and mentally retarded persons are be­
ing treated with antipsychotic medication without the benefit of a sub­
stituted judgment determination. Such practice not only violates the 
legal rights of mentally disabled persons, but also may import severe 
consequences for treating physicians. In Harnish v. Children's Hospi­
tal Medical Center,52 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
adopted, for the first time, the doctrine of informed consent. The 
opinion stated in relevant part, that "a physician's failure to divulge in 
a reasonable manner to a competent adult patient sufficient informa­
tion to enable the patient to make an informed judgment whether to 
give or withhold consent to a medical or surgical procedure constitutes 
professional [medical] misconduct ...."53 In our view, a physician's 
failure to obtain the court's "informed consent" by way of a substi­
tuted judgment before rendering extraordinary medical treatment to 
an incompetent person constitutes similar medical misconduct, and 
may result in the initiation of malpractice litigation. 
Compliance with the law is only one issue, however, and those 
doctors unwilling to adhere to the Saikewicz line of decisions are pre­
sumably aware that they may be sanctioned. Apart from this, we sug­
gest that representatives from both the medical and legal professions 
begin to explore together existing resource problems and perhaps con­
sider whether legislative action in the form of revisions or amendments 
to the law is, in fact, desired. 
VII. THE BROPHY DECISION 
Recently, the supreme judicial court issued its opinion in the con­
troversial and highly-publicized case of Brophy v. New England Sinai 
Hospital, Inc. 54 The Brophy decision is a further example of the appli­
cation of the Massachusetts substituted judgment model. In this case, 
the supreme judicial court decided that food and water may be with­
held from a patient who is in a persistent vegetative state but not ter­
minally ill. 55 The court's balancing of Mr. Brophy's individual 
interests and preferences against specifically identified state interests is 
worth reviewing in some detail. 
At the trial court in Brophy, the presiding judge found that if Mr. 
51. Id. 
52. 387 Mass. 152,439 N.E.2d 240 (1982). 
53. Id. at 154-55,439 N.E.2d at 242. 
54. 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986). 
55. Id. at 441, 497 N.E.2d at 639. 
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Brophy were competent, his choice would be to forego the provision of 
food and water and thereby terminate his life. 56 Despite this finding, 
the trial court concluded that the state's interest in the preservation of 
life outweighed Mr. Brophy's individual interest and preference to de­
cline treatment. 57 The trial court also concluded that it would be 
"ethically inappropriate to cause the preventable death of Brophy by 
the deliberate denial of food and water, which can be provided to him 
in a noninvasive, nonintrusive manner which causes no pain and 
suffering...."58 
In reversing the trial court decision, the supreme judicial court 
balanced Mr. Brophy's substituted judgment to reject treatment 
against three potentially countervailing state interests: (1) the preser­
vation of life, (2) the prevention of suicide, and (3) the maintenance of 
the ethical integrity of the medical profession. 59 Regarding the state's 
interest in the preservation of life, the supreme judicial court indicated 
that "the State's interest in life encompasses a broader interest than 
mere corporeal existence. In certain, thankfully rare, circumstances 
the burden of maintaining the corporeal existence degrades the very 
humanity it was meant to serve. The law recognizes the individual's 
right to preserve his humanity, even if to preserve his humanity means 
to allow the natural processes of a disease or affliction to bring about a 
death with dignity."60 Thus, the supreme judicial court concluded 
that the state's interest in the preservation of life did not overcome 
Brophy's right to discontinue treatment.61 
The supreme judicial court also rejected the state's interest in the 
prevention of suicide as an applicable consideration.62 The court 
noted "[a] death which occurs after the removal of life sustaining sys­
tems is from natural causes, neither set in motion nor intended by the 
patient."63 
Finally, regarding the ethical integrity of the medical profession, 
the supreme judicial court concluded that as long as the defendant 
hospital was not forced to withhold food and water from the patient, 
56. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., No. 85EOOO9GI (Norfolk Division, 
Probate and Family Court Department, Oct. 21, 1985). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 42. 
59. See infra notes 60-64. 
60. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 434, 497 N.E.2d at 635. 
61. Id. at 439, 497 N.E.2d at 638. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. (quoting Rasmussen v. Flemming, No.2 CA-CIV 5622, slip op. at 11-12 
(Ariz. Ct. App. June 25, 1986) (quoting In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114,660 P.2d 738, 743 
(1983»). 
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the integrity of the medical profession is not violated.64 The supreme 
judicial court noted that there is substantial disagreement in the medi­
cal community over the appropriate medical action.65 The supreme 
judicial court remanded the case to the trial court for a new judgment 
to be entered ordering the hospital to assist the guardian in transfer­
ring the patient to a different facility or to his home where the patient's 
wishes could be effectuated. 66 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Katz urges that, "[a]bove all, physicians and patients 
must learn to converse with one another" (p. xxi). In cases of ex­
traordinary medical treatment for incompetent persons, Massachu­
setts has created a judicial model which, in effect, forces conversation 
between the physician and trial court regarding a patient's medical 
needs and individual preferences. We have described, in part, the crite­
ria and mechanics of the Massachusetts model, as defined by the 
supreme judicial court and appeals court, and some of the practical 
problems involved with the model, such as inadequate judicial and 
medical resources. In so doing, it is our hope that judges, lawyers, and 
doctors can understand and cooperate better in this important deci­
sionmaking process. Throughout the article, we have tried to convey 
what we consider to be the fundamental principle underlying the Mas­
sachusetts substituted judgment model-that of individual autonomy 
and the "emphasis away from a paternalistic view of what is 'best' for 
a patient toward a reaffirmation that the basic question is what deci­
sion will comport with the will of the person involved. . . . "67 As 
participants in this symposium, we have been fascinated by the numer­
ous parallels between Professor Katz's thesis and many of the basic 
tenets expressed in the Saikewicz line of decisions. 
64. [d. at 439-41, 497 N.E.2d at 638-39. 
65. [d. at 440 0.38, 497 N.E.2d at 638-39 0.38. 
66. [d. at 441, 442, 497 N.E.2d at 639-40. 
67. [d. at 431, 497 N.E.2d at 633. 
